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EXTENDING PROTECTION UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT TO APPOINTED STATE JUDGES
EEOC v. State of Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990)
In EEOC v. State of Vermont,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that appointed state judges are entitled to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act's (ADEA or the Act)2 protection against discrimina-
tory practices.3 In so holding the Second Circuit concluded that ap-
pointed state judges do not fall within the Act's exception for
"appointees on a policymaking level."4
In 1982, the Vermont Senate confirmed the gubernatorial appointment
of Louis P. Peck to the state supreme court.5 In 1987, the Vermont Gen-
eral Assembly voted to retain Justice Peck for a second six-year term.'
The Vermont Constitution provides for mandatory retirement of all
1. 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 11(f), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1985 &
Supp. 1990). For a general overview of the ADEA, see Mawdsley, Protecting Older Workers: En-
forcement of ADEA, 54 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 399 (Aug. 31, 1989).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(aXl) provides: "It shall be unlawful for an employer... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
4. The ADEA, with certain exceptions, generally protects all employees from employer dis-
crimination on the basis of age. Section 630(f) provides:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by any employer except that the term
"employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such
officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an
immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the
office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees sub-
ject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency, or political subdi-
vision .... (Emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 630(fX1985 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
5. E.E.O.C. v. State of Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1990). The Vermont Constitution
provides:
The Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall fill a vacancy in the office of
the... associate justice of the Supreme Court... from a list of nominees presented to him
by a judicial nominating body established by the General Assembly ....
VT. CONST., ch. II, § 32.
6. 904 F.2d at 796. The Vermont Constitution provides:
The justices of the Supreme Court... shall hold office for terms of six years .... At the
end of the initial six year term.., the question of his continuance in office shall be submit-
ted to the General Assembly and he shall continue in office for another term of six years
unless a majority of the members of the General Assembly... voting on the question vote
against his continuing in office.
VT. CONST., ch. II, § 34.
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judges and justices upon reaching age seventy. 7 Thus, when Justice Peck
turned seventy in December of 1988, the state scheduled his retirement
for the following June.8
Justice Peck filed an age discrimination complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).9 After failed attempts to
negotiate on Justice Peck's behalf, the EEOC fied suit against Vermont's
Court Administrator. 10 The complaint charged that Vermont's
mandatory retirement provision violated the ADEA's prohibition of age
discrimination. 1 The United States District Court for the District of
Vermont held that the ADEA precluded application of Vermont's retire-
ment provision to appointed state judges.12 The Second Circuit affirmed,
and held: the ADEA protects appointed state judges from mandatory
retirement because such judges do not fall within ADEA's exception for
appointees on a policymaking level. 3
7. The Vermont Constitution provides that [a]U [appointed] justices of the Supreme Court...
shall be retired at the end of the calendar year in which they attain seventy years of age .... VT.
CONST., ch. II, § 35.
8. 904 F.2d at 796.
9. Id. Congress established the EEOC as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4 (1981), as amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, § 2(a)(11), 92 Stat. 183.
Congress directed the EEOC to "prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment
practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1981).
10. EEOC v. State of Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 262 (D. Vt. 1989). Congress authorized the
EEOC to bring a civil action against an employer on behalf of a person charging a discriminatory
labor practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1981).
The State Office of the Court Administrator is responsible for administering and enforcing the
retirement provision of Vermont's constitution as it relates to judges and justices. 717 F. Supp. at
262.
11. 904 F.2d at 796. See supra note 3 for the relevant ADEA language. The EEOC sought
injunctions against application of the retirement provision generally and as applied to Justice Peck,
as well as monetary relief for Justice Peck and others adversely affected by the provision. 904 F.2d
at 796-97.
12. 904 F.2d at 797.
13. Id. at 800. See supra note 4 for exceptions to ADEA's protection. The Second Circuit also
rejected the state's claim that the tenth amendment prohibits congressional interference with Ver-
mont's purview over state judicial structure. 904 F.2d at 802 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985)). See also Schlitz v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
681 F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Va. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988). In
Schlitz, the court stated that the claim that the tenth amendment bars federal intervention in the
appointment of state judges "might have been more persuasive during the reign of the 'traditional
governmental function' concept of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 [(1976), how-
ever,] it must ... fail under the Supreme Court's [more recent] analysis in Garcia." The court noted
that the Supreme Court in Garcia cited with approval EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983),
in which the Court upheld the extension of ADEA protection to state and local governments. 681 F.
Supp. at 332. For a general overview of sovereign immunity, see Lopez, The ConstitutionalDoctrines
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Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
196714 to promote the employment of older workers15 based on their
ability rather than their age. 16 The Act protects state employees 17 from
age discrimination."8 However, the Act excepts certain employees from
protection, including "appointees on a policymaking level."' 9
of State Immunity From Federal Regulation and Taxation After Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 4 J.L. & PoL 89 (1987). This Comment does not address the issue of state
sovereignty and federal intervention.
14. See supra note 2.
15. The Act's protections apply to any individual who is "at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (Supp. 1990). Originally, the Act only protected workers until they reached the age of
sixty-five, but Congress amended the Act in 1978 to raise the upper limit to seventy years of age. In
1986 Congress removed the upper limit altogether and afforded protection to all individuals forty
years of age or more. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, § 12, 29
U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (1985) (raising upper limit of Act's coverage to 70), amended by Age Discrimination
in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, § 2(cXl), 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 1990) (eliminating
upper limit altogether).
16. The Senate committee recommending passage of the ADEA stated:
[I]ts purpose is threefold: to promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and to help em-
ployers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.
S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
504, 505.
17. In 1974, Congress amended the definition of the term "employer" within the ADEA to
read: "The term also means... a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instru-
mentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency .. " Fair Labor
Standards Amendments Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 630(bX2) (1985).
18. See supra note 3.
19. In addition to removing appointees on a policymaking level from protection, the Act also
excludes elected officials and their immediate advisers from coverage. See supra note 4. It is settled
that appointed state judges do not constitute immediate advisers within the meaning of the Act. See
E.E.O.C. v. State of Vermont, 717 F. Supp. 261, 264 (D. Vt. 1989) (appointed state-court judge only
exempted from the Act's protection if he is "an appointee on the policymaking level"); Schlitz v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 333 (E.D. Va. 1988) (plain language of the Act indi-
cates that appointed state judges are protected). But see Apkin v. Treasurer & Receiver General,
401 Mass. 427, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988) (appointed state judges not protected because the Act does
not preempt state constitution's mandatory retirement provision).
Some courts, however, invoke the elected officials exception to exclude appointed state judges
from the Act's protection. These courts reason that it is nonsensical to extend coverage to appointed
state judges but not elected state judges because their stations and responsibilities are identical. See
Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 401 Mass. 427, 435, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988) ("The
application of the 1986 Amendment to state judges, making a distinction between elected and ap-
pointed judges, would produce a helter-skelter, irrational pattern throughout the country.");
E.E.O.C. v. State of Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. IlM. 1989) (no principled basis exists to treat
appointed judges differently from elected judges). But see Diamond v. Cuomo, 70 N.Y.2d 338, 514
N.E.2d 1356 (1987) (distinction between elected and appointed state officials under ADEA does not
offend equal protection).
Legislative history directly addressing the ADEA's paragraph of exceptions is sparse. E.E.O.C. v.
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In the absence of Supreme Court guidance,2 0 lower courts widely differ
in their treatment of the ADEA's paragraph of exceptions.21 The out-
come often depends on the relative weight a court gives to: (1) structural
interpretation of the paragraph's plain language;22 (2) analysis of the
Act's underlying legislative intent;23 and (3) examination in light of con-
stitutional considerations. 24 Most courts addressing the issue exclude ap-
pointed state judges from ADEA protection.25
In Schlitz v. Virginia,26 the plaintiff charged that the state violated the
ADEA in denying him reappointment to a Circuit Court Judgeship in
the City of Portsmouth. In denying the state's motion to dismiss, the
court became the first to extend ADEA protection to appointed state
judges,27 thereby precluding application of Virginia's mandatory retire-
State of Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990). However, the ADEA's definition of "employee"
is based on identical wording in Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1985) (EEOA). The legislative history of the EEOA provision is instructive in
interpreting the ADEA definition. It states:
It is the intention of the [Title VII] conferees to exempt elected officials and members of
their personal staffs, and persons appointed by such elected officials as advisors or to poli-
cymaking positions at the highest levels of the departments or agencies of State or local
governments, such as cabinet officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the
local level. It is the conferees intent that this exemption shall be construed narrowly.
Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746, H. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in part in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2137, 2179, 2180
[hereinafter Joint Statement].
20. On November 26, 1990 the Supreme Court granted certiori in Gregory v. Ashcroft to de-
cide the issue discussed in this Case Comment. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990). Arguments are scheduled for the late Spring of 1991 and a decision should be handed down
in June of 1991.
21. See infra notes 25-31, 34-38, 43-47, 50-53. For text of the exceptions paragraph, see supra
note 4.
22. See infra notes 25-31, 39, 51-53, 60-61.
23. See infra notes 32-33, 37-38, 4647, 54-56, 62-66.
24. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 606 (8th Cir.) (Missouri's mandatory retirement
provision does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 507 (1990); E.E.O.C. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 53-54 (1st Cir.
1988) (Massachusetts' constitutional provision mandating retirement of state judges at age seventy
valid absent clearer evidence of congressional intent to preempt under its supremacy clause power).
25. See infra notes 33, 35-36, 43-47.
26. 681 F. Supp. 330, 331 (E.D. Va. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
27. The Fourth Circuit reversed based solely on legislative immunity. 854 F.2d at 45-6. The
Fourth Circuit did not address the district court's interpretation of the ADEA. Instead, the court
stated that "[w]e are being asked to consider whether the Assembly's purported motives for declin-
ing to re-elect plaintiff are a pretext for age discrimination. This inquiry, in our view, runs squarely
afoul of the doctrine of legislative immunity." Id. at 45. The Fourth Circuit explained that legisla-
tive immunity is the protection extended to actions taken within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/16
1991] EXTENDING PROTECTION UNDER ADEA
ment provision.2" Interpreting the Act's plain language, the court held
that the similarities between employment as a judge and other traditional
forms of employment2 9 rendered inapplicable the ADEA's policymaking
appointee exception."a The court rejected the state's argument that ap-
pointed judges should be treated the same as elected judges, who do not
receive the Act's protections.31 Because Congress plainly intended to
distinguish between elected and appointed officials generally32 and dis-
played no intent to specially exempt judges from the Act, the court con-
strued the ADEA broadly33 to apply to appointed judges who fit the
statutory definition of "employees." 4
The First Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in EEOC v. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts.35 The court determined that judges fit
within the ADEA's exception for "appointees on a policymaking
activity, shielding them from judicial review." Id. at 45 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
376 (1951)).
28. 681 F. Supp. at 334. This determination agreed with the EEOC's formal opinion at the
time that appointed state judges fall within the ADEA's definition of employees. EFE.O.C Formal
Opinion to the Honorable Claude Pepper, E.E.O.C. COMP. MAN. (BNA) N:1001 (April 7, 1987).
29. 681 F. Supp. at 333. The court noted that judges draw salaries, work under the direction
and authority of the state, and perform other employee duties and thus "must be deemed employees
of and in need of the same protections afforded the remainder of the employed population." Id.
(citation omitted).
30. See supra note 4.
31. 681 F. Supp. at 334.
32. Id. Because the ADEA does not directly address judges in any manner, the court found
congressional intent to distinguish between elected and appointed officials generally, branding the
defendant's argument that no basis exists for distinguishing elected from appointed judges "narrow."
Id. The court noted that Congress may have excluded elected, but not appointed, officials from the
Act's protection in the belief that the electorate will not discriminate on the basis of age, and thus
such protection is unnecessary. Id. But cf. supra note 19.
33. Id. at 333. The court recognized that the ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimina-
tion in the work place based on age." Id. (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 120 (1985)). The court also noted that the defendant mischaracterized the clear statement rule
"by demanding explicit mention of each official to be included within the scope of the ADEA." 681
F. Supp. at 333. But see supra note 4, infra note 44.
34. Id. at 334. In addition, the court rejected summarily the state's contention that judges are
policymakers. Id. at 331 n.l.
35. 858 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir. 1988). The court framed the issue in terms of whether Congress
intended to limit significantly "the power of the people of... Massachusetts to determine its qualifi-
cations of judges." Id. at 53. In holding that Congress failed to display such an intention in its
enactment of the ADEA, the court indicated that only an extremely clear statement of such an
intent would suffice because "the tenure of state judges is a question of exceeding importance to each
state, and a question traditionally left to be answered by each state. Any federal encroachment... in
this area, therefore, strikes very close to the heart of state sovereignty." Id. at 54.
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level," 3 6 relying on the modem judge's undeniable role as a decision
maker.37 The court also addressed the relevant legislative history con-
cerning the exceptions paragraph38 and concluded that Congress in-
tended to apply the exception for appointees equally to employees in all
three branches of government. 39 The First Circuit rejected the conten-
tion that the exception for appointees on a policymaking level only ap-
plies to appointees who work closely with elected officials. 4° The court
interpreted the Act's language as excepting two categories of appointees:
advisers, whether policymakers or not; and policymakers, whether advis-
ers or not.4' Finally, the court found it "nonsensical" to exclude elected,
but not appointed, judges from the Act's protection when their duties are
identical.42
36. See supra note 4.
37. 858 F.2d at 55-56. The First Circuit rejected as unrealistic a characterization of judges as
"mechanized law-and-fact processors, scientifically applying settled principles of law to established
fact patterns." Id. at 54.
Similarly, in In Re Stout, 559 A.2d 489 (Pa. 1989), the court denied a judge protection from
Pennsylvania's mandatory retirement provision. The Stout court held that the duties of a modem
judge involve policymaking, given the definition of "policy" as: "a definite course or method of
action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine
present and future decisions .... Id. at 495 (quoting WES"rER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 910 (1985 ed.)). In concluding that Justice Stout did engage in policymaking within
this definition, the court noted that a justice's constitutional duties included the exercise of supervi-
sory authority over all the courts, the appointment of a court administrator, the duty to prescribe
general rules governing the courts, the promulgation of regulations and directives having the force of
statutes, and the abrogation of common law rules during the course of their decision-making process.
Id. But see EEOC v. State of New York, 729 F. Supp. 266, 270 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 907 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing a memorandum by the New York State Administrative
Board concluding that appointed judges are not "high policymakers" and do not fall within any of
the other exceptions to the Act in support of holding that the ADEA applies to New York's ap-
pointed state judges).
38. 858 F.2d at 55. The court actually analyzed Title VII's legislative history because its defini-
tion of "employees" is identical to that adopted by Congress in the ADEA. Id. See Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (provisions of the ADEA derived in haec verba from Title VII). See
also supra note 19.
39. 858 F.2d at 55-56. The court noted concerns raised by Senator Ervin during consideration
of Title VII's amendments that Title VII's protections not apply to "top decisionmakers" in any of
the three branches. Id. at 55 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 1837 (1972)). In response to Senator Ervin's
concerns Congress did not distinguish between those employed in the different branches of govern-
ment. Id.
40. 858 F.2d at 55.
41. Id. at 55-56 (citing Joint Statement, supra note 19, at 2137, 2179). In refuting the EEOC's
contention that the ADEA requires a close, working relationship to an elected official, the court
called for a "slightly different understanding of who is a policymaker for purposes of the exception."
858 F.2d at 56.
42. Id. at 57. See also supra notes 19, 31.
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The Eighth Circuit followed the First Circuit's lead43 and held the
ADEA inapplicable to state appointed judges in Gregory v. Ashcroft.' In
Gregory, the court focused on the similarity of a judge's thought process
to that of an executive appointee and concluded that judges are policy-
makers.4 It then interpreted the structure of the exceptions paragraph
to suggest that Congress intended to exclude both appointed and elected
judges.46 Finally, the court rejected the Schlitz court's analysis of the
Act's legislative history;47 instead finding a congressional intent to apply
the ADEA's exceptions to all three branches of government.48
In EEOC v. State of Vennont,49 the Second Circuit become the first
circuit court to hold the ADEA exception for appointees on a poli-
cymaking leve 50 inapplicable to appointed state judges, effectively ex-
tending ADEA protection from discriminatory employment practices to
such judges.51 The court first examined the structural framework of the
ADEA's exceptions paragraph. 2 The court emphasized Congress'
43. See supra notes 34-41.
44. 898 F.2d 598, 604 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990). Four Missouri judges
claimed that the state's mandatory retirement provision violated the ADEA. Id. at 599. Like the
First Circuit in EEOC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir. 1988), the Eighth
Circuit framed the issue in terms of whether Congress displayed a clear intent to supersede state
authority over its judicial system, again raising the high hurdle of sovereignty. 898 F.2d at 600. See
supra note 34.
45. 898 F.2d at 601. The Eighth Circuit noted that, "[w]ithin the boundaries established by
settled law," judges exercise the same sort of discretion, self-restraint, and thoughtful judgment as
appointees in the legislative and executive branches. Id. at 601-02. But see supra note 36. Cf. Spell
v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding police officers equivalent to policymakers,
despite the municipality retaining ultimate authority); Owens v. Fulton County, 690 F. Supp. 1024
(N.D. Ga. 1988) (district attorneys are policymakers for purposes of civil rights claim). The court
then described the many administrative and supervisory functions of judges within the Missouri
court system. 898 F.2d at 602.
46. 898 F.2d at 602. The court rejected the Judge's claim that because Congress placed the
exception for "appointees on a policymaking level" between exceptions relevant primarily to the
legislative and executive branches of government, policymaking judges warrant similar protection.
Id. See supra note 4 for text of the exceptions paragraph. The court found this interpretation im-
plausible deeming it unlikely that Congress intended to protect appointed state judges while exempt-
ing elected ones. 898 F.2d at 602. See supra notes 19, 31.
47. 898 F.2d at 601. See supra notes 25-33.
48. 898 F.2d at 602. The court found that Congress considered the judiciary an "agency" of
state government. Id. at 603. Thus, the phrase "policymaking positions at the highest levels of...
agencies of State.. ." in the exceptions paragraph makes the policymaker exception applicable to
appointed state judges. Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 4 for text of the exceptions paragraph.
49. 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
50. See supra note 4.
51. 904 F.2d at 797.
52. Id. at 797-98. See supra note 4.
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placement of the exception for "appointees on a policymaking level" be-
tween those for "persons chosen to be on [an elected official's] personal
staff" and for an elected official's "immediate advisers. 53 Given the na-
ture of the surrounding exceptions, the court concluded that Congress
intended all three exceptions to apply only to employees working closely
with elected officials, and not to state judges. 54
Second, the court reviewed the legislative history of the exceptions
paragraph.55 The court noted the explanation given by the senator who
recommended the exception for appointees on a policymaking level. 56
The court concluded that Congress adopted the provision under this sen-
ator's assumption that it applied only to employees of the executive and
legislative branches.57
Finally, the Second Circuit asserted that, even if the ADEA's excep-
tions are not limited to executive and legislative employees, appointed
state judges are still protected because judges do not traditionally make
policy-they resolve disputes.5" The court asserted that judges generally
rely on the other branches of government to fashion policy, then inter-
pret, clarify or apply those policies to resolve disputes.59 The court noted
the tentative nature of lower court decisions, which are subject to rever-
53. 904 F.2d at 798. See supra note 4 for text of the exceptions paragraph.
54. Id. The court invoked principles of statutory construction to determine that if Congress
wanted to exclude a wider group of policymakers than those working closely to elected officials, it
would have placed the "policymaking employee" exception at the end of the series, rather than in
the middle. Id. But see supra note 45; infra notes 60-61.
55. 904 F.2d at 798. The Second Circuit actually considered the legislative history pertaining
to the adoption of the definition of "employee" in Title VII. See also supra notes 19-37.
56. 904 F.2d at 799-80. The Senate originally adopted the amendment to Title VII's definition
of "employee" without the "appointees on a policymaking level" language. However, Senator Jacob
Javits of New York succeeded in his efforts to clarify the amendment, explaining: "I was thinking
more in terms of a cabinet... who would do the main and important things. That is what I would
define those things expressly to mean." Id. (citing 118 CONG. REc. 4097 (1972)). The court found
this explanation indicative of Congress' intent to apply the exception only to legislative or executive
appointees, and not to judges. 904 F.2d at 800. But see supra note 38.
57. 904 F.2d at 800. The court noted that Congress mentioned judges only briefly at the outset,
the debate focusing on elected officials and other executive employees. Id. (citing Joint Statement,
supra note 19 at 2137, 2179, 2180).
58. 904 F.2d at 800.
59. Id. at 800-01. See also King v. Snide, 144 Vt. 395, 479 A.2d 752, 756 (1984) ("If the main
thrust of a statute seems unfair or unjust, the remedy must be sought in a legislative change,"); 87-88
Op. Vt. Att'y Gen. 3 (August 7, 1987) (though courts weigh policy considerations and render deci-
sions with policy implications, in so doing they act as the reviewers of the policies of others rather
than as the "makers" of policy themselves). But see EEOC V. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
680 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Mass. 1988) ("[i]t is nevertheless clear that 'policymaking' is indisputably
a part of the function of judging"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
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sal at any time by a higher authority.'
The Second Circuit's conclusion that the ADEA extends protection
from discriminatory practices to appointed state judges is persuasive.
The court correctly interpreted the structure of the ADEA's definition of
"employee. ' 61 If Congress intended to exclude from ADEA protection a
broad category of independent, appointed employees, such as judges, it
would have placed such an exemption apart or at the end of its list of
exemptions, and not between two other exceptions clearly related only to
executive or legislative employees. 62
Second, the Second Circuit's analysis of the paragraph's legislative his-
tory is compelling.63 In light of the Act's stated purpose of preventing
age discrimination against most state employees, 6 logic dictates that
Congress intended to except only elected officials and certain close asso-
ciates, such as appointed advisers. 65 The electorate determines these offi-
cials' tenure, and thus no protection from employer discrimination is
necessary. 66 The distinction contemplated in the exceptions paragraph
lies not between appointed and elected judges, but rather between ap-
pointed and elected officials, generally.67
Finally, the Second Circuit wisely recognized that a judge's traditional
function does not include policymaking. 6  Judges resolve disputes be-
tween parties. In so doing they properly limit their decisions to the inter-
pretation or clarification of policies established by a legislative or
111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) ("fj]udges must exercise the same sort of discretion in decisionmaking ... that
is required of 'appointee[s] on the policymaking level' in the executive and legislative branches.").
60. 904 F.2d at 801. But see EEOC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56 (Ist
Cir. 1988) ("each judge,... no matter how lowly.... is at the very top of his particular 'policymak-
ing' chain of command").
61. 904 F.2d at 797-98. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. See also supra note 4 for the text of the
exceptions paragraph. But see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 602 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 507 (1990) (stating that such a limited reading of the policymaking level exception would
result in none of the four categories of exceptions from the coverage of the ADEA applying to
appointed employees in the judicial branch, and doubting that Congress intended this result).
63. See supra notes 54-56.
64. See supra notes 16, 27 and accompanying text.
65. 904 F.2d at 798. But see EEOC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st
Cir. 1988) (Congress intended to except all policymakers, whether an adviser to an executive or
legislative official or not).
66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. See Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D. Va. 1988). See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
68. But cf. supra notes 36, 44 and accompanying text.
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executive body.69
The Vermont decision correctly interprets the ADEA's definition of
"employee" and places appropriate weight on the nature of a judge's
traditional functions. By extending ADEA protection to appointed state
judges, the Second Circuit afnirmed Congress' clear intent to protect ap-
pointed state judges as it does other state appointees.
Lawrence A. Walke
69. 904 F.2d at 801. See supra note 28. But see In Re Stout, 559 A.2d 489, 495-96 (Pa. 1989)
("To suggest that a Justice... is not involved in policymaking matters is to ignore the character of
the duties and responsibilities imposed upon members of the Court .... ).
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IN MEMORY OF F. HODGE O'NEAL
The Editors and Staff of the Washington University Law
Quarterly dedicate the third F Hodge O'Neal Corporate and
Securities Law Symposium to the life and memory of Professor
F. Hodge O'Neal. We hope this annual symposium will con-
tinue to impact the practice and study of corporate law, an area
in which his scholarship has dominated for so many years. His
inspirational wisdom, as well as his genial southern accent, col-
legiality, humorous anecdotes, and love for ballroom dancing
will be long remembered.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/16
